Encouraging moderation: Clues from a simple model of ideological
  conflict by Marvel, Seth A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
9.
35
46
v1
  [
nli
n.A
O]
  1
7 S
ep
 20
12
Encouraging moderation: Clues from a simple model of ideological conflict
Seth A. Marvel,1, ∗ Hyunsuk Hong,2 Anna Papush,3 and Steven H. Strogatz3
1Department of Mathematics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA
2Department of Physics and Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry,
Chonbuk National University, Jeonju 561-756, Korea
3Department of Mathematics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA
(Dated: September 6, 2018)
Some of the most pivotal moments in intellectual history occur when a new ideology sweeps
through a society, supplanting an established system of beliefs in a rapid revolution of thought. Yet
in many cases the new ideology is as extreme as the old. Why is it then that moderate positions so
rarely prevail? Here, in the context of a simple model of opinion spreading, we test seven plausible
strategies for deradicalizing a society and find that only one of them significantly expands the
moderate subpopulation without risking its extinction in the process.
The social history of ideas involves the frequent replay
of a single story: there is a widely accepted and deeply
ingrained dogma in the community. This dogma helps to
justify the community’s institutions and shape its com-
mon practices. Then, in the midst of this stable milieu,
a new doctrine emerges. Backed by a small group of
unwavering advocates, it challenges the status quo and
steadily wins converts, eventually replacing the previous
system to become the dominant ideology of the group.
In some cases, there is an enduring consensus that
the new doctrine marks a tangible improvement on the
old. This is the case for the American civil rights move-
ment [1], women’s suffrage [2, 3], and paradigm shifts
in science [4–6]. However in many other situations, the
newer doctrine is not clearly better. After some time as
the dominant approach, it too is overtaken by a younger
alternative, which in turn is itself replaced, and so on.
This second situation is often seen in rapidly spreading
political campaigns [7], the booms and busts of credit
lending and consumer confidence [8, 9], cultural fash-
ions and short-lived reforms (e.g., Prohibition in the
United States) [10, 11], methodological or topical fads
in academia, and various political revolutions [12].
A natural question is this: why do communities, and
sometimes entire societies, get caught in these swings
from one ideological extreme to the other when neither
delivers a sustainable solution? Why does not a majority
of the population settle on an intermediate position that
blends the best of the old and new?
There are several ways in which this question might be
answered, but here we give one that is purely mathemati-
cal: the environment of successive ideological revolutions
is not conducive to moderate mindedness simply from a
dynamical perspective. In particular, almost all of the
intuitive ways of encouraging moderation either fail to
expand the moderate subpopulation or make it vulnera-
ble to collapse in the process of encouraging its growth.
In this Letter, we provide evidence for this claim by
studying a minimal model of ideological revolution. Crit-
ically, this model only addresses large-scale ideological
conversions and does not treat the many other common
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FIG. 1: Model structure (see text for definitions of A, B,
AB, and Ac). Labels on the arrows indicate the allowed af-
filiation(s) of a speaker that converts a listener from one sub-
population to another in the direction of the arrow.
processes found in real communities, such as apparent
conversions within the old paradigm and situations where
there is no conversion at all but rather a splitting of opin-
ions, or fragmentation.
The model (Fig. 1) starts from an assumption of a
community consisting of four nonoverlapping subpopula-
tions: those that currently hold an extreme opinion A;
those that currently hold the conceptually opposing opin-
ion B (in the simplest case, just the negation of A); those
that currently hold neither A nor B (the moderates); and
those that hold A indefinitely and are immune to the in-
fluence of others (we call these committed believers or
A zealots). We partially overload notation, using A, B,
AB, and Ac, respectively, to denote both the individu-
als in these four subpopulations and the subpopulations
themselves. This model builds on earlier pioneering work
in sociophysics [13–20] and is directly inspired by (but
different from) a model examined in a recent study of
opinion dynamics [21, 22].
The dynamics of the basic model are determinis-
tic, continuous and mean-field, derived as the large-
population limit of the following random process: time is
discrete, and at each time step we select two individuals
uniformly at random and randomly choose one of them to
be the speaker and the other the listener. If the speaker
is an A or B and the listener is a B or A, respectively,
2TABLE I: Interactions that change the membership of sub-
populations A, B, and AB in the basic model. The Ac sub-
population is constant.
Speaker
Listener Listener
pre-interaction post-interaction
A,Ac
B AB
AB A
B
A AB
AB B
then the listener is dissuaded from his or her extremist
position and becomes an AB. However, if the listener is
an AB, then the listener becomes an A if the speaker is
an A and a B if the speaker is a B. In all other cases,
there is no change in the state of the speaker and listener
(Table I). Note that in this highly simplified model, mod-
erate speakers do not produce a change of mind in either
their listeners or themselves; only extremists successfully
rally others to their cause.
Let nA, nB, and nAB denote the expected fractions
of the total population of N individuals corresponding
to the uncommitted A, B, and AB subpopulations, re-
spectively, and let p denote the constant fraction of the
population in the committed Ac subpopulation. We will
study how varying p, the proportion of zealots, affects
the eventual state of the system. Using this new nota-
tion, we can consider the expected change to the subpop-
ulation fractions in the limits of a large population and
a vanishing time step (which we take to grow like N and
shrink like 1/N , respectively). This reduces our discrete
dynamics to the following rate equations:
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB,
(1)
where nAB = 1−p−nA−nB and the overdot denotes dif-
ferentiation by time. Since we present no formal evidence
that the dynamics of (1) do actually occur in practice, our
work could alternatively be viewed as posing this model
and its subsequent generalizations as interesting in their
own right.
Now suppose we run the system (1) to equilibrium
starting from a population initially composed of only Ac
and B individuals. We will use this initial condition for
all the systems considered in this Letter; the idea is that
A represents the new doctrine and B the reigning view.
If we then track the final fractions of nA, nB, and nAB as
functions of p, we find (as in Ref. [21]) that the equilib-
rium state changes dramatically as we increase p through
a critical value pc (Fig. 2). For p < pc the system remains
similar to how it started—most of the individuals main-
tain B. However as p is increased through pc, the system
undergoes a discontinuous transition, and for p > pc the
entire population quickly reaches a consensus on A. A bi-
furcation analysis shows that pc = 1−
√
3/2 ≈ 0.134 [23].
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FIG. 2: The equilibrium values of nA (red plus signs), nB
(blue dots), and nAB (magenta open circles) for the basic
model as functions of p, assuming an initial population with
(nA, nB) = (0, 1 − p). The vertical dashed line marks the
critical value pc = 1 −
√
3/2 ≈ 0.134. At values of p greater
than pc, nB , and nAB are zero and nA = 1− p.
To test the robustness of these mean-field predictions,
we simulate the model on a diverse set of real social net-
works. Figure 3 shows that in each case, the nB vs p
curves resemble the mean-field result depicted in Fig. 2.
The primary differences are a lower pc value for the real
networks and a small, stable fraction of peripherally lo-
cated B believers for p > pc.
With (1) as our starting point, we now ask how we
might alter the model to encourage moderation. Specifi-
cally, we would like to (i) increase the equilibrium size of
the moderate subpopulation, and (ii) decrease the chance
that this equilibrium size could drop substantially if the
parameter values (just p for the basic model) were to vary
a little. In search of a strategy that does both, we explore
seven different generalizations of the basic model. Three
generalizations are discussed here in the main text; the
rest are treated in the Supplemental Material [23]. Fig-
ures 4(a)-(c) summarize mean-field results for these three
generalizations, and for comparison, the corresponding
simulation results on a real social network are shown in
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FIG. 3: The equilibrium fraction of B believers remaining af-
ter the basic model is run on the giant connected component
of (a) the U.S. network of corporate board memberships in
1994 [24], (b) four coauthorship networks in the physics di-
vision of arXiv.org [25], and (c) the friendship networks of
the location-based social networking websites Gowalla and
Brightkite [26]. Note the abrupt transitions in nB ; compare
with the corresponding curve in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 4: (a)-(c): Mean-field results obtained analytically for generalizations of the basic model with (a) stubborn moderates, (b)
evangelical moderates, and (c) nonsocial deradicalization (see the text for details). The final equilibrium values of nA (red plus
signs), nB (blue dots), and nAB (magenta open circles) for the initial condition (nA, nB) = (0, 1− p) are plotted as a function
of the new parameter (s, r, or u) in the corresponding generalized model. Of the three strategies shown—and in fact for all
seven considered in the Supplemental Material [23]—only nonsocial deradicalization allows for the growth of the moderate
fraction up to 1 − p without risking its extinction. (d)-(f): Representative simulation results for the discrete-time versions of
the models with (d) stubborn moderates, (e) evangelical moderates, and (f) nonsocial deradicalization when these models are
run on the arXiv coauthorship network for high energy physics theory (hep-th) [25]. The plots show the equilibrium fractions
of nA (red plus signs), nB (blue dots), and nAB (magenta open circles) obtained. Each simulation is started from the state in
which a random but highly interconnected fraction p of the population is committed to a belief in A and the rest believe B.
The simulation is then run for 108 time steps after which the values of nA, nB , and nAB are tabulated. The constant fractions
of zealots in the six panels of this figure are (a) 0.1, (b) 0.1, (c) 0.05, (d) 0.035, (e) 0.02, and (f) 0.02.
the panels beneath them [Figs. 4(d)-(f)]. Importantly,
these do not constitute full empirical validations of the
model and its generalizations (which would require dy-
namical data that are hard to obtain). Rather, we in-
clude these simulations only as an indication of where
the results of such tests might lie. Furthermore, we only
consider the equilibrium values reached from the pre-
revolution initial condition (nA, nB) = (0, 1 − p); as dy-
namical systems, the basic model and its generalizations
are capable of a wider range of behaviors [23].
As a first attempt at achieving (i) and (ii) above, sup-
pose we could somehow make the moderates less likely
to convert to either of the two radical positions. We can
represent this by generalizing the basic model to
n˙A = (1− s)(p+ nA)nAB − nAnB,
n˙B = (1− s)nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB ,
(2)
where the stubbornness parameter s indicates how likely
a moderate is to remain moderate after listening to an
extremist. When s is zero, we recover the basic model.
Intuitively, one might expect that increasing s should
increase the size of the moderate subpopulation. Indeed,
when s is small enough, the moderate subpopulation does
grow slightly with increasing s [Figs. 4(a) and 4(d)]. But
remarkably, if s increases past a certain threshold, the
moderates are driven to extinction; the size of their sub-
population drops to zero.
We can examine this surprising behavior in another
way by calculating how s affects pc (the critical fraction
of zealots needed for the revolution to succeed). Intuition
would suggest that pc should increase with s; the more
stubborn the moderates are, the more zealots are needed
to persuade them and everyone else. In fact the opposite
is true: pc decreases with s, dropping monotonically from
1−
√
3/2 at s = 0 to zero at s = 1 [23]. Thus, increasing
the stubbornness of the moderates makes the population
more vulnerable to takeover by the zealots.
To make sense of why pc should decrease with s, it
helps to realize that increasing s not only reduces the
flow of AB individuals to opinion A but also to opin-
ion B, thereby depleting both the uncommitted A and
B subpopulations. With competition from B extrem-
ists over the AB subpopulation weakened as a result, it
takes fewer A zealots (and hence a lower pc) to convert
the moderates to the A camp.
This explanation suggests that evangelism is an impor-
tant force in the dynamics. So as a second strategy, we
might try having the moderates actively promote mod-
4eration via the following generalization:
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB − rnAnAB,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB − rnBnAB,
(3)
where the new parameter r is a nonnegative real number
that reflects the intensity of the moderates’ evangelism.
Again it may seem intuitively clear that the size of
the moderate fraction should increase if the moderates
start actively deradicalizing the population. For r up to
unity, however, the outcome is similar to that of mak-
ing the moderates more stubborn. Figures 4(b) and 4(e)
show that at a certain value of r, the size of the moder-
ate subpopulation snaps discontinuously to zero. If the
moderates’ campaign of persuasion is sufficiently success-
ful from the start—that is, if r starts and stays large
enough—then the moderates do in fact maintain a large,
robust equilibrium population. However, if they fail
to sustain this level of persuasiveness indefinitely, their
evangelistic efforts can instigate their own extinction.
Finally, let us consider a third strategy: suppose that
the fanatics are deradicalized by a promoderation media
campaign or other environmental stimulus rather than
through social interaction with moderates. We could
then expect the dynamics to take the following form:
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB − unA,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB − unB,
(4)
where u is a nonnegative parameter representing the rate
at which the radicals abandon their radical position in
response to the nonsocial stimulus.
In contrast to the first two strategies (as well as four
others treated in the Supplemental Material [23]), in-
creasing the new parameter (u) in this system generally
increases the equilibrium nAB toward a limit of 1 − p,
with the one exception of a discontinuous drop partway
through the ascent in Fig. 4(c). However, the drop is
not to zero as it was for the other strategies, and it van-
ishes in the limit of small p. Furthermore, following the
drop, regrowth of nAB is rapid. Hence, this mechanism
of promoting moderation, which we might call nonsocial
deradicalization, provides the first acceptable means that
we have found for expanding the moderate population
in the midst of an ideological revolution. This holds for
the three strategies in this Letter, and also for the four
others in the Supplemental Material [23].
By itself, this final assessment should be regarded with
caution. We suggest that a greater emphasis be placed on
our general approach as a framework for testing possible
strategies as part of a continuing research program, which
through further study might well uncover other means
of fostering moderation more sophisticated than those
considered here.
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Supplemental Material
Here we derive the mean-field results described in the
main text. Our approach consists of analyzing seven dif-
ferent one-parameter generalizations of the basic model.
Our central conclusion is that only one of these, nonsocial
deradicalization, offers a robust means of expanding the
moderate subpopulation. We finish with an example of a
two-parameter generalization that, like nonsocial derad-
icalization, can deradicalize all uncommitted extremists
without risking the extinction of the moderates.
In order to help interpret the results below, we recom-
mend that the reader plot the nullclines of each system
and study how they vary with the parameter values using
the MATLAB program pplane. This program is avail-
able online at http://math.rice.edu/∼dfield/dfpp.html
and is free for educational use.
THE BASIC MODEL
The dynamics of the basic model are
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB,
(1)
where the overdot represents differentiation by time and
nAB = 1− p−nA−nB (see the main text for definitions
of the remaining terms). The nullclines of (1) are
0 = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB, (2a)
0 = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB . (2b)
The first implies that
nB =
(p+ nA)(1− p− nA)
p+ 2nA
, (3)
and the second (by factoring) implies either nB = 0 or
nB = 1− 2p− 2nA. (4)
If we substitute nB = 0 into (2a), we obtain two solu-
tions: nA = −p and nA = 1 − p. So (1) has fixed points
at (nA, nB) = (−p, 0) and (nA, nB) = (1− p, 0).
To obtain the remaining fixed points, we set (3) and
(4) equal to each other and solve the resulting quadratic
in nA to obtain
nA =
1
6
(
1− 4p±
√
4p2 − 8p+ 1
)
. (5)
Together with (4), this gives a third and fourth fixed
points so long as the discriminant of (5) is nonnegative.
Solving for the roots of the discriminant of (5) gives
pc = 1 ±
√
3/2. We can disregard the value with the
positive sign because p represents a fraction of the total
population and thus must be less than one. The value
with the negative sign represents the p at which the third
and fourth fixed points coalesce in a saddle-node bifur-
cation in (nA, nB) phase space.
GENERALIZATION I:
STUBBORN MODERATES
One way to encourage expansion of the moderate sub-
population would be to try to make existing moderates
less likely to abandon their moderate views and convert
to an extreme position. This idea can be captured with
the following generalization of (1):
n˙A = (1− s)(p+ nA)nAB − nAnB,
n˙B = (1− s)nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB.
(6)
Here s is a parameter on the unit interval. Increases in
s correspond to the moderates becoming less prone to
switch to a radical position.
Following the approach of the previous section, we find
that this system has fixed points at (nA, nB) = (−p, 0)
and (nA, nB) = (1− p, 0), as well as where
nA =
(1− s)(1 − 3p)− p±
√
∆(s, p)
6− 4s (7)
and
nB =
(1− s)(1− p)− p− (2 − s)nA
1− s , (8)
with ∆(s, p) = (2 − s)2p2 − 2(1− s)(4− 3s)p+ (1− s)2.
This second pair of fixed points exist everywhere that
∆(s, p) > 0, and the curve ∆(s, p) = 0 represents the
parameter pairs (s, p) at which the third and fourth fixed
points coalesce in a saddle-node bifurcation.
Solving ∆(s, p) = 0 in terms of p (i.e. finding the roots
of the quadratic polynomial in p) gives
pc =
(1 − s)(4− 3s)± 2
√
(1− s)3(3− 2s)
(2− s)2 . (9)
(The c subscript is added to indicate a connection to
literature on critical phenomena and phase transitions.)
The root in (9) with the plus sign represents a saddle-
node bifurcation that occurs in the third quadrant of the
(nA, nB) plane where nA and nB are both negative, so
the root with the minus sign is the only one of interest to
us. This curve descends monotonically from p = 1−
√
3/2
at s = 0 to p = 0 at s = 1. For the (s, p) pairs below it,
∆(s, p) > 0, so the third and fourth fixed points exist for
these (s, p). The third and fourth fixed points generally
have small values for nA and large values for nB, and
the one having the nA with the negative sign in (7) is
stable. (We can show this by an analysis of the Jacobian
of (6).) By contrast for the (s, p) pairs above the curve,
∆(s, p) < 0, so the only fixed point of relevance in this
region of parameter space is (nA, nB) = (1−p, 0). Again
by stability analysis on the Jacobian of (6), this point is
stable for all (s, p) pairs on the unit square.
2GENERALIZATION II:
EVANGELICAL MODERATES
Another approach to increasing the moderate fraction
would be to make the moderates evangelical for their
moderate perspective. To reflect this idea, we can gener-
alize the basic model in the following way:
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB − rnAnAB,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB − rnBnAB,
(10)
where r is a nonnegative parameter representing the ef-
fectiveness of the moderates’ evangelism.
Analyzing this model as we did the basic model, we
again find that there are two fixed points on the nA axis:
(nA, nB) = (1−p, 0) and (nA, nB) = (−p/(1−r), 0), and
two fixed points off the nA axis with locations given by
nA =
(1− r)(1 − 3p)− (1 + r)p±
√
∆(r, p)
6− 4r (11)
and
nB =
(1− r)(1 − p)− p− (2 − r)nA
1− r , (12)
where ∆(r, p) = 4(1− r)2p2− 4(1− r)(2− r)p+(1− r)2.
The curve ∆(r, p) = 0 gives the (r, p) pairs at which
a saddle-node bifurcation of the third and fourth fixed
points occurs. However since p must be on the unit in-
terval and r is nonnegative, it can be easily shown that
the only relevant segment of this curve is
pc =
2− r −√3− 2r
2− 2r , (13)
where r is restricted to the unit interval. This segment
starts at p = 1 −
√
3/2 when r = 0 and declines mono-
tonically to zero as r reaches 1. For allowed (r, p) below
the curve, ∆(r, p) > 0. So the two fixed points given
by (11) and (12) exist in this region. For allowed (r, p)
above the curve (13), ∆(r, p) < 0 and so (11) and (12)
do not exist in this region and the only fixed points are
(nA, nB) = (1− p, 0) and (nA, nB) = (−p/(1− r), 0).
There is also a second bifurcation, this time transcrit-
ical, that occurs when the fixed point on the nA axis
located at nA = −p/(1 − r) passes leftward through
the fixed point at nA = 1 − p as r is increased through
r = 1/(1 − p). For comparison with (13), we can write
this bifurcation curve as a critical p: pc = 1 − 1/r. This
curve starts from p = 0 at r = 1 and asymptotically ap-
proaches p = 1 as r is increased toward positive infinity.
From analysis of the Jacobian of (10), we find that
the fixed point with the nA in (11) having the negative
sign is stable, while the other is unstable. We also find
that the fixed point at (nA, nB) = (1 − p, 0) is stable
when 0 < r < 1/(1 − p). However as r is increased
through the transcritical bifurcation, the fixed point at
nA = −p/(1− r) inherits the stability of the fixed point
at 1− p. Thus for r > 1/(1− p), the equilibrium value of
nA decreases to zero like 1/r for large r.
GENERALIZATION III:
NONSOCIAL DERADICALIZATION
A third way to try to increase the size and stability of
the moderate subpopulation would be to provoke radi-
cals on both sides to become moderate by some nonso-
cial means. This strategy is captured by the following
generalization of the basic model:
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB − unA,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB − unB,
(14)
where u is a nonnegative parameter representing the rate
of deradicalization.
We can again treat this system in the same way that
we did the basic model. The first pair of fixed points
have nB = 0 and
nA =
1
2
(
1− 2p− u±
√
4up+ (1− u)2
)
. (15)
Note that the discriminant of (15) is always positive, so
these first two fixed points exist for all allowed p and
u. For fixed p, the positive root of (15) shrinks to zero
like 1/u as u is increased toward positive infinity. This
is easily seen from the asymptotic expansion of nA in
powers of 1/u, which begins
nA = p(1− p)
(
1
u
+
(1− 2p)
u2
+
(1− 2p)2
u3
+ · · ·
)
. (16)
For the second pair of fixed points, the first coordinate
is given by
nA =
1
6
(
1− 4p− u±
√
∆(u, p)
)
(17)
and the second coordinate by
nB = 1− 2p− u− 2nA, (18)
where ∆(u, p) = 4p2 − 4(2 + u)p+ (1 − u)2.
Solving ∆(u, p) = 0 for p, we obtain the curve on which
the saddle-node bifurcations occur:
pc = 1 +
u
2
±
√
3 + 6u
2
. (19)
Only the root in (19) with the minus sign is of interest
to us, because only this root has values less than 1 for
positive u. Additionally, we are only interested in the
segment of this curve with u on the unit interval, since
for larger u the curve represents a saddle-node bifurcation
in the third quadrant of the (nA, nB) plane.
Below this curve segment, we find that ∆(u, p) > 0, so
the third and fourth fixed points exist there. By analyz-
ing the Jacobian of (14), we can show that the fixed point
having the nA in (14) with the negative sign is stable and
draws in trajectories to a small nA and large nB. How-
ever above the curve segment, we find that ∆(u, p) < 0,
so the only fixed points of (14) are the two with nB = 0
and nA values given by (15). The one of these with the
positive nA value is stable and draws in all trajectories
of interest for all allowed (u, p) above the curve.
3GENERALIZATIONS IV, V, AND VI:
ASYMMETRIC VERSIONS OF
GENERALIZATIONS I, II, AND III
Generalizations I and II above lead to an annihilation
of the moderate subpopulation for some values of s and
r. This occurs because at these values of s and r, much
of the B subpopulation is absorbed into the moderate
subpopulation early in the time series, which allows the
A believers to subsequently convert the entire popula-
tion to their belief A. Motivated by this observation, we
now consider three variations on the above generaliza-
tions that all attempt to shift the dynamics in favor of
the B believers. We first show that each of these models
has a fixed point that converges to (nA, nB) = (0, 1− 2p)
in a large-parameter limit. We then discuss the implica-
tions of this for the fraction of moderates in each model.
To prepare the first variation (Generalization IV), we
omit the factor of (1 − s) in the second equation of (6)
to obtain
n˙A = (1− s)(p+ nA)nAB − nAnB,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB .
(20)
Like the original system, this new system has fixed points
at (nA, nB) = (−p, 0) and (nA, nB) = (1 − p, 0). It also
has fixed points where
nA =
1− 4p+ 2sp±
√
4p2 − 4(2− s)p+ 1
6− 2s (21)
and nB = 1− 2p− 2nA. In the limit as s tends to 1, this
second pair of points converges to (nA, nB) = (1/2−p, 0)
and (nA, nB) = (0, 1− 2p).
A second variation (Generalization V) is obtained by
discarding the last term in the second equation of (10).
This yields
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB − rnAnAB,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB.
(22)
The fixed points of this system are located at (nA, nB) =
(−p/(1− r), 0) and (nA, nB) = (1 − p, 0), and where
nA =
1− 4p+ rp±
√
(2− r)2p2 − 2(4− r)p+ 1
6− 2s (23)
and nB = 1 − 2p − 2nA. In the large-r limit, the fixed
point having the nA with the minus sign in (23) becomes
(nA, nB) = (0, 1− 2p).
Finally, the third variation (Generalization VI) in-
volves omitting the final term in the second equation of
(14) to obtain
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − nAnB − unA,
n˙B = nBnAB − (p+ nA)nB .
(24)
This system has two fixed points along the nA axis at
nA =
1
2
(
1− 2p− u±
√
4up+ (1 − u)2
)
. (25)
It also has an additional two where
nA =
1
6
(
1−4p+u±
√
4p2 − 8(1 + u)p+ (1 + u)2
)
, (26)
and nB = 1−2p−2nA. Analogous to the two cases above,
the fixed point with the negative sign in (26) converges
to (nA, nB) = (0, 1− 2p) in the large-u limit.
The point (nA, nB) = (0, 1 − 2p) therefore appears as
the limit of a fixed point in all three of these new models.
Furthermore at this fixed point, the moderate subpopu-
lation is nAB = p, so neither p nor nAB can exceed 1/2
at this fixed point. A more extensive analysis of the ex-
istence and stability of all fixed points shows that when
p < 1/2 and each parameter (s, r, and u) is large enough,
this fixed point exists in the first quadrant and is stable,
receiving the trajectories of a large basin of attraction
around it including the initial point (nA, nB) = (0, 1−p).
GENERALIZATION VII:
OPPOSING ZEALOTS
A seventh strategy for expanding the fraction of mod-
erates in the population is to assemble a faction commit-
ted to B that could counterbalance the existing faction
committed to A. If we represent the size of this second
fraction by q, then the basic model becomes
n˙A = (p+ nA)nAB − (q + nB)nA,
n˙B = (q + nB)nAB − (p+ nA)nB,
(27)
where now nAB = 1− p− q − nA − nB.
We can find exact expressions for the fixed points of
this system, but they are more complicated than those
of the first three generalizations above. This is primarily
due to the fact that we cannot factor out an nB from the
left-hand side of the second rate equation in (27), so we
must use the quartic equation (rather than the quadratic
equation) to obtain the fixed points. Due to the size of
the solutions, we don’t include them here. However they
can be easily found with a computational platform for
symbolic algebra such as Mathematica.
When we arbitrarily vary p and q, the fixed points of
(27) generally undergo saddle-node bifurcations in the
(nA, nB) phase plane. In the special case that we set
q = p, varying the combined parameter (which we will
just call p from now on) produces a two-dimensional su-
percritical pitchfork bifurcation. The handle and middle
tine of this pitchfork lie along the line nB = nA, with
the origin located along the handle. At some critical p,
the two outside tines of the pitchfork emerge and grow
outward symmetrically about nB = nA.
To find the critical p where this bifurcation occurs,
let’s consider the nullclines of (14) under the substitution
q = p:
0 = (p+ nA)nAB − (p+ nB)nA, (28a)
0 = (p+ nB)nAB − (p+ nA)nB. (28b)
4If we subtract each side of (28b) from the corresponding
side of (28a), we obtain 0 = (nA−nB)(1−3p−nA−nB),
so either nB = nA or nA + nB = 1 − 3p. The former,
by substitution into (28a), gives the fixed points on the
line nB = nA: (nA, nB) = (−p,−p) and (nA, nB) =
((1− 2p)/3, (1− 2p)/3). The latter, also by substitution
into (28a), yields 0 = n2
A
− (1− 3p)nA + p2, or
nA =
1
2
(
1− 3p±
√
(1− 3p)2 − 4p2
)
. (29)
Since both p and 1 − 3p must be positive (recall that
1 − 3p is equal to nA + nB), the discriminant vanishes
when 1 − 3p = 2p, or when p = 1/5. So this is the p of
the pitchfork bifurcation that we seek.
In fact we not only can find the p of the pitchfork bifur-
cation but also the (q, p) pairs at which the saddle-node
bifurcations occur. We can do so by identifying the parts
of the fixed points of (27) that are under even-powered
roots. In fact, there is only one such part (although it
appears many times throughout the expressions for the
fixed points) and setting it equal to zero gives an implicit
function for the curve in parameter space along which the
bifurcations occur. With some simplification, this is
32(p3q + pq3) + 61p2q2 − 100(p2q + pq2)
+ 82pq + 4(p2 + q2)− 8(p+ q) + 1 = 0. (30)
Since the highest power of p and q in (30) is 3, this level
set could instead be expressed as a set of two explicit
functions, either p in terms of q or the other way around.
The two separate functions correspond to two different
saddle-node bifurcations, and the locus where they meet
marks the p of the pitchfork bifurcation.
More broadly, (30) represents a cusp catastrophe and
can be shifted and rotated into a more conventional ori-
entation (cusp positioned at the origin, pointing to the
right) with the new parameters a = p + q − 2/5 and
b = p− q. The variable coordinate, orthogonal to the pa-
rameter plane, may be taken to be nA, nB, or some rea-
sonable combination of these, for example (nA−nB)/
√
2
(the projection onto the line 0 = nA + nB).
A variety of interesting results can be proven for the
system (27). For example, one is that the nAB frac-
tion at equilibrium cannot exceed (3−
√
3)/6 (< 0.212).
Showing this consists of demonstrating that in either of
the two regions of parameter space partitioned by the
curve (30), the fraction of nAB at equilibrium is great-
est along this curve itself, with the maximum for the
region with small p and q occurring at the intersection of
(30) with the p axis, that is (q, p) = (0, 1 −
√
3/2), and
the maximum for the complementary region of parame-
ter space occurring at the locus of the cusp bifurcation
where (q, p) = (1/5, 1/5). (Here we have assumed that
the system is started from (nA, nB) = (0, 1− p), but the
result holds for any initial condition.) Evaluation of the
function for nAB at these points demonstrates that the
former has the larger value at (3 −
√
3)/6.
GENERALIZATION VIII:
STUBBORN MODERATES
AND OPPOSING ZEALOTS
Finally, we analyze a model that combines Generaliza-
tions I and VII:
n˙A = (1− s)(p+ nA)nAB − (q + nB)nA,
n˙B = (1− s)(q + nB)nAB − (p+ nA)nB ,
(31)
where nAB is again 1− p− q − nA − nB.
Our aim in studying this model is to evaluate whether
we can expand the moderate subpopulation with the fol-
lowing two-part strategy: (i) assemble a faction commit-
ted to B of the same size as that committed to A, and
(ii) increase s (the stubbornness of the moderates to re-
main moderate). For simplicity, we suppose that we have
already rallied a faction committed to B equal to the size
of that committed to A, or, in the parlance of the model,
q = p.
This leaves us with the following nullclines:
0 = (1 − s)(p+ nA)nAB − (p+ nB)nA, (32a)
0 = (1 − s)(p+ nB)nAB − (p+ nA)nB. (32b)
We expect a pitchfork bifurcation to occur at some value
p as a function of s. For s = 0, this p is just 1/5, as we
found in our analysis of Generalization VII.
If we subtract each side of (32b) from the corre-
sponding side of (32a), we obtain 0 = (nA − nB)[(1 −
s)(1 − 2p − nA − nB) − p], so either nB = nA or
nA + nB = 1 − 2p − p/(1 − s). The former combined
with (32a) gives the fixed points nA = nB = −p and
nA = nB = (1 − s)(1 − 2p)/(3 − 2s), while the latter
combined with same equation yields 0 = n2
A
− λnA + p2,
where we have defined λ = 1 − 2p− p/(1 − s). Thus we
have
nA =
1
2
(
λ±
√
λ2 − 4p2
)
. (33)
Now p must be positive, and since λ is the sum nA+nB,
it also must be positive. So the discriminant vanishes
when λ = 2p, or at
pc =
1− s
5− 4s, (34)
which is the p at which the pitchfork bifurcation occurs.
Note also that at this pc we have the beautiful result that
nA = nB = p.
Since (34) starts at p = 1/5 when s = 0 and descends
monotonically to p = 0 at s = 1, we can see immediately
that no matter how small p is, if we increase s enough
we will cross through the pc given by (34) and obtain an
nAB of (1− 2p)/(3− 2s). Moreover, before crossing this
pc, nAB is of size p/(1 − s). With additional work, we
can show that this implies the rise in nAB is continuous
and therefore robust to minor variations in s and p.
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FIG. 1: (color online) (a)-(d): Bifurcation sets for the models I, II, III, and VII with representative phase portraits shown in
miniature. The solid brown curves indicate boundaries along which bifurcations occur. Specifically, the curves in (a) and (c),
each branch of the curve in (d), and the left curve in (b) mark parameter pairs at which saddle-node bifurcations occur. The
right curve in (b) signifies a transcritical bifurcation, and the cusp of the curve in (d) coincides with a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation. More broadly, the curve in (d) reflects a cusp catastrophe. The qualitative structure of the phase plane changes
across these bifurcation curves. However it remains the same within each connected region and is illustrated by the inset
phase portraits. Each phase portrait has horizontal and vertical axes of nA and nB respectively and is restricted to the unit
square. The solid lines are nullclines and the closed and open dots represent, respectively, stable and unstable fixed points. The
horizontal dotted lines show the trajectories followed by corresponding plots (e)-(h). From left to right, the p values of these
dotted lines are 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, and 0.15. (e)-(h): The final equilibrium values of nA (red plus signs), nB (blue dots) and nAB
(magenta open circles) for the initial condition (nA, nB) = (0, 1− p) as a function of the new parameters (s, r, u, and q). Note
that only nonsocial deradicalization allows for arbitrary growth of the moderate population without risking its extinction. All
curves in panels (a)-(h) are computed exactly in the above sections.
